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NOTES

In the Wrong Place, at the Wrong

Time: Problems with the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights Use
of Contentious Jurisdiction
ABSTRACT

The Inter-American region has a history of widespread human rights
abuse. To combat this problem the Organization of American States has
developed a regional system for the protection of human rights. The system's adjudicatory body is the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
(the Court). In recent years the Court has expanded its power through its
exercise of contentious jurisdiction. Certain factors, however, that are
unique to the Inter-American region weigh against the Court's use of
contentious jurisdiction.

Tracing the development of the Inter-American human rights system in
general and the Court in particular, this Note evaluates the Court's
powers and questions whether contentiousjurisdiction should be utilized
to protect and promote human rights in the Inter-American region. Next,
this Note discusses those cases over which the Court has exercised contentious jurisdiction. This Note concludes with a discussion of three specific
problems raised by the Court's exercise of contentiousjurisdiction:its effect on Inter-American citizens' perception of the Court; its potential effect on advisory opinions issued by the Court; and, its effect on United
States ratification of the American Convention on Human Rights.
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INTRODUCTION

Since its inception in 1948, the Organization of American States (the
OAS)' has been developing methods for promoting and protecting
human rights. In recent years, particularly since the advent of the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights (the Court),2 the Inter-American system for the protection of human rights has expanded its authority rapidly.3 The Court's exercise of contentious jurisdiction is the most recent
OAS effort to quell human rights violations.

1. Charter of the Organization of American States, Apr. 30, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2394,
119 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter OAS Charter]. The OAS was created to achieve peace and
justice, promote solidarity, strengthen collaboration, and defend sovereignty within and
among the American States. Id. Within the United Nations, the OAS is a regional
agency. The OAS member states as of 1991 were: Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina,
Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba,
Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana,
Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, St. Kitts and
Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago,
United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela. 1 HUMAN RIGHTS: THE INrER-AMERICAN
SYSTEM, booklet 1, at 45 (Thomas Buergenthal & Robert E. Norris eds., 1982); THE
WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 1992, at 827-28 (1991).

2. The Court came into existence when the OAS adopted its statute in 1979. See
infra note 64; see also Resolution No. 448 taken by the General Assembly of the OAS at
its Ninth Regular Session, held in La Paz, Bolivia, Oct. 1979.
3. See infra Part II.
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The emergence of an Inter-American system for the protection of
human rights is a victory for the region, but in the context of the American States, the system's speed of development raises some concerns. This
Note considers whether contentious jurisdiction should be used to protect
human rights in the Inter-American system. At issue is how much authority the Court can exert without eroding past gains or inhibiting fu-

ture progress.
This analysis of the Court's impact on the region begins with an outline of the structure of the Inter-American human rights system. Part II
describes the regional human rights system's development, including its
origin, authority, and major organs. As a means of illustrating the effects
of contentious jurisdiction, Part III summarizes those cases in which the
Court has exercised its contentious jurisdiction.
Finally, Part IV presents various ways in which the Court's exercise
of contentious jurisdiction may impact the regional human rights system.
The focus is on the potential drawbacks of exercising contentious jurisdiction from the perspectives of citizens of the region, the Court's existing body of law, and United States ratification of the American
Convention.
II.

ORIGIN AND STRUCTURE OF THE INTER-AMERICAN HUMAN
RIGHTS SYSTEM

The current Inter-American system for protection of human rights has
two legal sources: the Charter of the Organization of American States'
(the OAS Charter) and the American Convention on Human Rights5
(the American Convention). These sources represent two distinct phases
in the development of the Inter-American system for the promotion and
protection of human rights; however, they share some of the same institutions and norms and together comprise a unified regional system.
A.

The OAS Charter

In 1948, at the Ninth International Conference of American States,
two documents codified and formally introduced the concept of human

rights in the Inter-American system: the GAS Charter6 and the Ameri4. OAS Charter, supra note 1.
5. American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, OEA/Ser. A/16 (English), OAS T.S. No. 36, 9 I.L.M. 673 [hereinafter American Convention].
6. The OAS Charter was opened for signature in Bogota, Colombia in 1948 and
entered into force in 1951 when Colombia became the fourteenth state to deposit its
ratification of the OAS Charter. OAS Charter, supra note 1, at 2394, 119 U.N.T.S. at
48.
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can Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man7 (the American Declaration). These documents initiated the first phase in the development of
the Inter-American human rights system.'
The OAS Charter and American Declaration treat human rights differently because of their differing objectives. The OAS Charter makes
relatively few references to human rights, and those references are in
nonspecific terms. For example, article 50) contains a general proclamation of "fundamental rights of the individual without distinction as to
race, nationality, creed or sex,"' and article 13 constrains the free development of member states to acts that "respect the rights of the individual

and the principles of universal morality."' 10 The American Declaration,
however, contains a specific and extensive enumeration of human rights.
It identifies civil and political rights as well as social, cultural, and economic rights." As part of the OAS Charter, the American Declaration is
legally binding.' 2
Twelve years after formally introducing the human rights concept, the
OAS established the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights' 3
(the Commission) as an "autonomous entity of the Organization of
American States."' 4 Its seven members act in their individual capacities,

7. American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, OAS Res. XXX, adopted
by the Ninth International Conference of American States (May 2, 1948), reprinted in 1
HUMAN RIGHTS: THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM, supra note 1, booklet 5, at 1 [hereinafter American Declaration].
8. Because the American Declaration is now a part of the OAS Charter, this section
examines the two documents together. See infra note 12.
9. OAS Charter, supra note 1, art. 5(j), at 2418, 119 U.N.T.S. at 54.
10. Id. art. 13, at 2419, 119 U.N.T.S. at 56.
11. For particular rights contained in the American Declaration, see supra note 7,
article 3 (Right to Religious Freedom and Worship), article 5 (Right to Protection of
Honor, Personal Reputation, and Private and Family Life), article 6 (Rights to a Family
and to the Protection Thereof), article 7 (Right to Protection for Mothers and Children),
article 12 (Right to Education), article 13 (Right to the Benefits of Culture), article 14
(Right to Work and to Fair Remuneration), article 15 (Right to Social Security), and
article 16 (Right to Recognition of Juridical Personality and of Civil Rights).
12. See TOM J. FARER, THE GRAND STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES IN LATIN
AMERICA 70-71 (1988) [hereinafter FARER, THE GRAND STRATEGY]. The OAS did not

intend originally for the American Declaration to be binding. However, the Protocol of
Buenos Aires, effective since 1970, amended the OAS Charter to incorporate by reference
the Statute of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, which defines human
rights as those rights set forth in the American Declaration. Id.
13. Fifth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, OEA/Ser.C/II.5
(English), 4-6 (1960), reprinted in I HUMAN RIGHTS: THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM,
supra note 1, booklet 6, at 134, 138.
14. 2 HUMAN RIGHTS: THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM, supra note 1, booklet 9, at
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not as state representatives.1 5 Initially, the Commission's responsibility
was to "promote respect for human rights"1 " enumerated in the American Declaration. A 1965 resolution, however, expanded the Commission's powers and gave it the responsibility of submitting an annual report to the OAS on the progress and protection of human rights in the
region.17 Subsequently, a 1970 amendment to the OAS Charter 8 (the

1970 Amendment) elevated the Commission to the status of an independent OAS Charter organ.
The 1970 Amendment broadened the Commission's powers and gave
it a more active role in the protection of human rights.1 9 In addition to

its original task of promoting human rights, the Commission obtained
the authority to investigate large-scale human rights violations through
2
"country studies" and to act on individual petitions involving violations
of rights that the American Declaration proclaimed. The 1970 Amendment explicitly anticipated the creation of the American Convention on
Human Rights2 and alluded to the creation of an Inter-American Court

iii. The OAS created the Commission to promote the observance and defense of human
rights and to serve as a consultative organ of the OAS. Id.
15. Statute of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, arts. 2-3, OEA/
Ser.L/V/II.65, doc. 6 (1985) (approved by Resolution No. 447, taken by the General
Assembly of the OAS at its Ninth Session, held in La Paz, Bolivia, Oct. 1979), reprinted
in

ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, HANDBOOK OF ExISTING RULES PERTAIN-

TO HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM 103 [hereinafter Statute of
the Commission]. The OAS Council elects each of the seven members. All member states
of the OAS participate in electing individuals to the Commission. Acting in their individual capacities allows those who are elected to eschew state partiality. See id.
16. Id. art. 1. The Commission's original responsibilities included making general
recommendations to each individual member state as well as to all member states as a
group, to prepare studies it considered advisable, to urge the governments of the member
states to provide the Commission with information on measures they adopted regarding
matters of human rights, and to serve as an advisory body to the OAS on human rights
issues. Id. art. 9.
17. Second Special Inter-American Conference, Res. XXII, (Rio de Janeiro, Nov.
17-30, 1965), reprinted in 1 HUMAN RIGHTS: THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM, supra
note 1, booklet 6, at 164.
ING

18. Protocol of Amendment to the Charter of the Organization of American States,
Feb. 27, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 607 (Protocol of Buenos Aires of 1967, entered into force Feb.
27, 1970) [hereinafter Protocol of Buenos Aires]; see also OAS Charter, supra note 1,
art. 53(e), at 2426, 119 U.N.T.S. at 70.
19. See Protocol of Buenos Aires, supra note 18, arts. 111, 150, at 691-701.
20. See infra subpart II(C) for a description of "country studies."
21. The Protocol of Buenos Aires was drafted in 1967, two years before the adoption
of the American Convention, and entered into force in 1970. See Protocol of Buenos
Aires, supra note 18, at 607.
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of Human Rights.2 2 Article 112(2) of the amendment provided that "[a]n
Inter-American convention on human rights shall determine the structure, competence and procedures of this Commission, as well as those of
other organs responsible for these matters."2

B.

The American Convention on Human Rights

The 1978 entry into force of the American Convention, 2 foreshadowed by the 1970 Amendment, 25 initiated the second phase in the devel-

opment of the Inter-American human rights system. The American Convention, similar to article 5(j) of the OAS Charter, contains a broad
nondiscrimination provision to ensure enjoyment of its enumerated rights
and freedoms "without any discrimination for reasons of race, color, sex,

language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
economic status, birth, or any other social condition." 2 Unlike the OAS
Charter, however, the American Convention also provides a catalog of
specifically protected human rights.
Among the American Convention's protected rights are twenty-three
categories of civil and political rights.2 7 In addition, the Convention requires state parties to undertake adoption of progressive measures for
"the full realization of the rights implicit in the economic, social, educational, scientific, and cultural standards set forth in the Charter of the
Organization of American States as amended by the Protocol of Buenos

22. See id. art. 150, 21 U.S.T. at'701.
23. Id. art. 112, 21 U.S.T. at 691.
24. See American Convention, supra note 5. The American Convention on Human
Rights was opened for signature on November 20, 1969 in San Jose, Costa Rica. It
entered into force on July 18, 1978, upon Grenada's deposit of the eleventh instrument
of ratification. The following member states have ratified the Convention: Argentina,
Barbados, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador,
Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Annual Report of the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights 1989, app. VII, OAS/Ser.L./V./III.21, doc. 14 (1989).
25. See Protocol of Buenos Aires, supra note 18, art. 150, 21 U.S.T. at 701.
26. American Convention, supra note 5, art. 1(1), at 1, 9 I.L.M. at 675.
27. These civil and political rights include the right to juridical personality, right to
life, right to humane treatment, freedom from slavery, right to personal liberty, right to a
fair trial, freedom from ex post facto laws, right to compensation for miscarriage of justice, right to privacy, freedom of conscience and religion, freedom of thought and expression, right of reply, right of assembly, freedom of association, rights of the family, right
to a name, rights of the child, right to nationality, right to property, freedom of movement and residence, right to participate in government, right to equal protection of the
law, and right to judicial protection. See id. arts. 3-25, at 2-8, 9 I.L.M. at 676-82.
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Aires." 2 8 Although the American Convention allows state parties to deviate from certain obligations, it does not permit derogation of a series of

basic human rights 29 Finally, similar to the American Declaration, the
American Convention details individual duties supplemental to the enumerated individual rights: "(1) Every person has responsibilities to his
family, his community, and mankind; [and] (2) The rights of each person are limited by the rights of others, by the security of all, and by the
just demands of the general welfare, in a democratic society." 3 To ensure that the state parties honor these human rights commitments, the
American Convention grants supervisory authority to two organs: the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights."
C.

The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights

Although the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights functions as an organ of both the OAS Charter and the American Convention, 2 it performs distinct roles for each entity. Under the OAS Charter,
the Commission conducts country studies and investigates individual petitions which allege violations of rights that the American Declaration
identifies. 33 The Commission may exercise these functions with respect
to any OAS member state. 4 In comparison, the Commission's main
function under the American Convention is to investigate individual petitions and interstate charges of human rights violations. 5 Thus, the Com-

28. Id. art. 26, at 9, 9 I.L.M. at 683.
29. Id. art. 27. The Convention "does not authorize any suspension of the following
articles: Article 3 (Right to Juridical Personality), Article 4 (Right to Life), Article 5

(Right to Humane Treatment), Article 6 (Freedom from Slavery), Article 9 (Freedom
from Ex Post Facto Laws), Article 12 (Freedom of Conscience and Religion), Article 17
(Rights of the Family), Article 18 (Right to a Name), Article 19 (Rights of the Child),
Article 20 (Right to Nationality), and Article 23 (Right to Participate in Government),

or of the judicial guarantees essential for the protection of such rights." Id.
30. Id. art. 32, at 10, 9 I.L.M. at 684. See American Declaration, supra note 7, for
its list of duties, which includes: article 29 (Duties to Society), article 30 (Duties toward
Children and Parents), article 31 (Duty to Receive Instruction), article 32 (Duty to
Vote), article 33 (Duty to Obey the Law), article 34 (Duty to Serve the Community and
the Nation), article 35 (Duties with Respect to Social Security and Welfare), article 36

(Duty to Pay Taxes), article 37 (Duty to Work), and article 38 (Duty to Refrain from
Political Activities in a Foreign Country).

31.

American Convention, supra note 5, art. 33, at 11, 9 I.L.M. at 685.

32.

Id. arts. 34-51, at 11-15, 9 I.L.M. at 685-89.

33. Statute of the Commission, supra note 15, art. 18, at 109-10.
34.

Id.

35. See American Convention, supra note 5, arts. 41-51, at 12-14, 9 I.L.M. at 686-
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mission may initiate country studies under its OAS Charter authority,
investigate individual petitions under the OAS Charter or the American
Convention, and investigate interstate charges under American Convention authority. The Commission may exercise its American Convention
powers, however, only with respect to states that have ratified the
Convention.3 6
Country studies are on-site observations the Commission conducts in
an OAS member state.37 Pursuant to its OAS Charter authority, the
Commission first gathers information about human rights conditions in a
particular state and prepares a draft report addressing the state's potential violations of rights enumerated in the American Declaration."8 Next,
the Commission allows the state the opportunity to review the draft report and to present additional evidence or comments. 3 9 The Commission
analyzes the state's response to determine if its report requires modification to reflect any new information.4 The Commission then decides
whether to publish the report.4 ' If the responding state refutes evidence
of any violations or agrees to comply with the recommendations the
Commission sets forth in the report, the Commission has no obligation to
publish the report.42 In addition to publishing the report, the Commission may submit it to the OAS General Assembly as part of its annual
report to that body.43 The General Assembly's subsequent discussion of
a country study, particularly if it elects to pass a resolution in line with
the report, may influence a state's decision whether to cease human
rights violations.4 4
The Commission reviews individual petitions pursuant to its authority
under either the OAS Charter or the American Convention. If the suspect state is a party to the American Convention, the Commission reviews individual petitions under that authority; otherwise, it reviews
89, An "interstate charge" arises when a state party alleges that another state party has
committed a violation of a right that the Convention guarantees. Id. art. 45, at 13, 9
I.L.M. at 687.
36. Id.
37, Regulations of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, arts. 55-62
(1980), reprinted in HANDBOOK

OF ExISTING RULES PERTAINING TO HUMAN RIGHTS

IN THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM,

Regulations].
38, Id. arts. 59-62, at 136-37.
39, Id. art. 62(a), at 137.
40. Id. art. 62(c), at 138.
41, Id. art. 62(d), at 138.
42, Id.
43. Id. art. 63, at 138-39.
44. Id. art. 53, at 135.

supra note 15,

at

115

[hereinafter Commission
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them under its OAS Charter authority.45 The source of the Commission's authority determines' procedures and, at times, the outcome of the
Commission's review.
The OAS Charter and the American Convention differ with regard to
the Commission's powers and procedures in three significant areas:
human rights petitions and communications, the definition of human
rights, and the available remedies. First, the procedure for filing petitions and communications depends on whether the state has ratified the
American Convention. States that have ratified the Convention must adhere to the petition procedure outlined in article 19(a) of the Statute of
the Commission, pursuant to articles 44-51.46 Nonratifying OAS member states follow the Commission's original procedure, which is restated
in article 20 of the Statute of the Commission.4" The most significant
difference between the filing procedures is that petitions and communications which allege violations by state parties to the Convention are subject to a stringent list of requirements.4" Communications about an OAS
member state that is not a party to the Convention are not subject to
such strict requirements; the Commission therefore is able to pursue its
investigations more easily.
Second, the definition of protected human rights depends on whether
the Commission is acting under the OAS Charter or the American Convention. In its role as an OAS Charter organ dealing with member states
that have not ratified the American Convention, the Commission draws
exclusively upon the American Declaration's definition of human
rights.4 9 When dealing with states that have ratified the American Convention, however, the Commission relies on the American Convention's
definition." This distinction is important because, although the American Convention draws heavily on the American Declaration, there are
45. Statute of the Commission, supra note 15, arts. 18-19, at 109-10. The Commission on occasion has argued that the Convention or some part of it is binding even on
states that have not ratified it. See David Forsythe, Human Rights, The United States
and the Organizationof American States, 13 HUM. RTs. Q. 66, 69 (1991) (citing Larry
LeBlanc, Problems in Interpreting and Applying Inter-American Human Rights Regime
Norms (1989) (unpublished paper)).
46. Statute of the Commission, supra note 15, art. 19(a), at 110; see also Commission Regulations, supra note 37, arts. 31-41, at 127-31 (containing the many rules applicable to petitions and communications regarding state parties to the Convention).
47. Statute of the Commission, supra note 15, art. 20, at 111; see also Commission
Regulations, supra note 37, arts. 51-52, at 134 (demonstrating the lack of strict rules
applicable to petitions concerning members that are not parties to the Convention).
48. American Convention, supra note 5, arts. 44-51, at 13-14, 9 I.L.M. at 687-89.
49. Statute of the Commission, supra note 15, art. 1, at 105.
50. Id.
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some critical distinctions. For example, the American Convention enumerates only civil and political rights,5 1 whereas the American Declaration enumerates economic and cultural rights as well.52
Third and most significant, the two documents provide different remedies. Individual petitions for relief from violations by states that have not
ratified the American Convention usually conclude with a final report. 583
The Commission may publish the decision and present it to the OAS
General Assembly in the Commission's Annual Report. 5 Presentation to
the General Assembly may then lead to the passing of a General Assembly resolution. Passing a General Assembly resolution can have a significant impact on the behavior of a state that the Commission has charged
with a human rights violation.55 OAS General Assembly resolutions
carry considerable moral and political weight; they are not, however, legally binding. In contrast, the Commission acting under the American
Convention may bring cases arising from individual petitions before the
Court, which may result in binding decisions. 6
The American Convention also authorizes the Commission to accept
interstate petitions, 57 but the jurisdictional rules for handling state complaints vary from those governing individual complaints. For example,
the Commission obtains jurisdiction over individual petitions regarding
any state that has ratified the American Convention.58 The Commission
may accept such individual petitions from almost anyone;59 there is no

51. American Convention, supra note 5, arts. 3-25, at 2-8, 9 I.L.M. at 676-83.
However, article 26 of the American Convention incorporates by reference the specific
economic and cultural rights set forth in the OAS Charter. Id., art. 26, at 9, 9 I.L.M. at
683.
52. American Declaration, supra note 7, arts. 13-14.
53. Commission Regulations, supra note 37, art. 53, at 135.
54. Statute of the Commission, supra note 15, art. 18, at 109-10. This is similar to
the Commission's treatment of a country study. See supra subpart II(C).
55. See AG/Res. 950 (XVIII-0/88) Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (Resolution adopted in the thirteenth plenary session, held on
Nov. 19, 1988) reprinted in INTER-AMERICAN YEARBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1046
(1988).
56. Statute of the Commission, supra note 15, art. 19, at 110. States may also bring
cases before the Court. See infra subpart II(D). Even when states bring the action, however, the Commission must also appear. American Convention, supra note 5, art. 57, at
17, 9 I.L.M. at 691.
57. American Convention, supra note 5, art. 45, at 13, 9 I.L.M. at 687.
58. Id. arts. 44, 74(2), at 13, 20, 9 I.L.M. at 687, 694. The Convention enters into
force with respect to a ratifying state on the date of the deposit of its instrument of
ratification. Id. art. 74(2), at 20, 9 I.L.M. at 694.
59. Id. Specifically, any person, group, or legally recognized nongovernmental entity
may file a petition. Id. art. 44, at 13, 9 I.L.M. at 687.

COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
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requirement that a victim or a victim's surviving relative file the petition.
A state, however, may only file a petition against another state if both
states have ratified the American Convention and formally recognized
the Commission's jurisdiction to receive interstate complaints.6" Thus
far, only a handful of states have formally recognized the Commission's
jurisdiction over interstate petitions. 6

Although the Commission's functions under the American Convention
and the OAS Charter overlap, there are distinctions in the application of
the Commission's authority. Generally speaking, when operating as an
American Convention organ, the Commission's jurisdiction is more specific and its powers more extensive, whereas when operating as an OAS
Charter organ, the Commission's power is less distinct but more flexible.
For example, the Commission may move on its own initiative to investigate human rights conditions by performing a country study in any OAS
member state without any formal interstate or individual complaints.6 2
The speed and ease of this type of intervention is available under the
OAS Charter, but it is not possible under the more formal American
Convention system.
Because of its dual role under the American Convention and OAS
Charter, the Commission is able to operate among and within those
member states that have not ratified the American Convention. The duality has helped the Commission to evolve as the central body in the
Inter-American human rights system. This ability to promote and monitor respect for human rights in the entire Inter-American system, together with the Commission's nonadjudicatory nature, support maintenance of the Commission as the system's central body for human rights
enforcement.6"

60. Id. art. 45, at 13, 9 I.L.M. at 687.
61.

As of 1986, the following states recognized the Commission's jurisdiction over

interstate petitions: Argentina, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Jamaica, Peru, Uruguay,
and Venezuela. THOMAS BUERGENTHAL ET AL., PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE

AMERICAS 386 (2d ed. 1986) [hereinafter BUERGENTHAL, PROTECTING HUMAN
RIGHTS].

62. Statute of the Commission, supra note 15, arts. 18-20, at 109-10, 111.
63.

American Convention, supra note 5, art. 33, at 11, 9 I.L.M. at 685. The Ameri-

can Convention recognizes the Commission and the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights as its organs that address matters relating to state parties' adherence to the Con-

vention. Id. Because the Commission has been much more active than the Court and has
existed for a longer period of time, the Commission acts as the principal organ under the

Convention. See Statute of the Commission, supra note 15.
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The Inter-American Court of Human Rights

In addition to recognizing the Commission as an OAS Charter organ
and granting the Commission new powers, the American Convention
created the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.6 4 The Court's
stated purpose is "the application and interpretation of the American
Convention on Human Rights." 5 The Court executes this purpose
through its exercise of advisory or contentious jurisdiction. 6 Unlike the

Commission, the Court does not play a second role as an OAS Charter
organ; rather, it functions only pursuant to the American Convention.
The American Convention, however, does confer on the Court limited
judicial powers over OAS member states that have not ratified the American Convention."7 While its advisory jurisdiction extends to all OAS
member states, 8 the Court may exercise its contentious jurisdiction only
over states that are parties to the American Convention and that have
specifically recognized the Court's contentious jurisdiction."
1. Advisory Jurisdiction
Advisory opinions are not legally binding.7 Moreover, any OAS
member state or OAS organ"1 has standing to seek an advisory opinion
64. American Convention, supra note 5, arts. 52-69, at 16-18, 9 I.L.M. at 690-93.
The Statute of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, which the OAS adopted in
1979, governs the Court's actions. See Statute of the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights, reprinted in HANDBOOK OF EXISTING RULES PERTAINING TO HUMAN
RIGHTS, supra note 15, at 143 [hereinafter Statute of the Court].

65. Statute of the Court, supra note 64, art. 1, at 145.
66. American Convention, supra note 5, arts. 62, 64, at 17, 9 I.L.M. at 691-92.
67. Id. art. 64, at 17, 9 I.L.M. at 692. The Court's authority with respect to those
OAS member states that have not ratified the Convention is limited to advisory opinions.
Id.
68. Id,
69. Id. art. 62, at 17, 9 I.L.M. at 691-92. See infra section II(D)(2).
70. American Convention, supra note 5, art. 64, at 17, 9 I.L.M. at 692.
71. American Convention, supra note 5, art. 64, at 18, 9 I.L.M. at 692. The OAS
organs that may request advisory opinions are those listed in Chapter X of the OAS
Charter, and requests are restricted to matters falling within their respective spheres of
competence. Id. art. 64, at 17, 9 I.L.M. at 692. The OAS organs are: the General Assembly, the Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, the Councils, the
Inter-American Juridical Committee, the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights, the General Secretariat, the Specialized Conferences, and the Specialized Organizations. OAS Charter, supra note 1, art. 51, at 2425, 119 U.N.T.S. at 68. See The
Effect of Reservations on the Entry into Force of the American Convention (arts. 74, 75),
Advisory Op. No. OC-2/82 (Sept. 24, 1982), Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A): Judgments
and Opinions, No. 2, para. 14 (1982), reprinted in 22 I.L.M. 37 (1983).
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from the Court."2 The Court's advisory jurisdiction is not limited to interpretation of the American Convention. It extends to interpretations of
other treaties "concerning the protection of human rights in the Ameri-

can states."'73 In fact, any OAS member state may request an advisory
opinion regarding any international agreement that concerns human
rights in any member state of the OAS. 4 Additionally, any OAS member state may request an advisory opinion regarding the compatibility of
its laws with the American Convention or any other human rights
75
treaty.
While the Court enjoys the broadest advisory powers of any international court,7 6 it must work under three limitations.7 First, the Court
may consider only those treaties involving the protection of human rights
in an OAS member state. 8 Second, the Court cannot grant a request for
an advisory opinion that is likely to undermine the Court's contentious
79
jurisdiction or negatively affect the American Convention system.
Third, if the Court declines to render an opinion, it must do so by issuing a statement that explains why it elected not to exercise its
jurisdiction.8 0

72. American Convention, supra note 5, art. 64, at 17, 9 I.L.M. at 692; Statute of
the Court, supra note 64, art. 2(2), at 105.
73. Id. "American states" is defined as the OAS member states. See supra note 1
and accompanying text.
74. See "Other Treaties" Subject to the Consultative Jurisdiction of the Court (art.
64), Advisory Op. No. OC-1/82 (Sept. 24, 1982), Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A): Judgments and Opinions, No. 1, para. 14 (1982), reprinted in 22 I.L.M. 51 (1983) [hereinafter Other Treaties]. The question of what defines a "treaty" was most recently addressed
in an advisory opinion which Peru requested. The Court concluded that its advisory
jurisdiction can be exercised with regard to any provision dealing with human rights

contained in any international treaty applicable in any OAS member state. This includes
treaties in which one or more of the parties are not OAS member states. Id.
75.

American Convention, supra note 5, art. 64(2), at 17, 9 I.L.M. at 692.

76. Thomas Buergenthal, Human Rights in the Americas: View from the InterAmerican Court, 2 CONN. J. Irr'L L. 303, 308 (1987) [hereinafter Buergenthal,
Human Rights].
77.

Other Treaties, supra note 74, paras. 18-31, 22 I.L.M. at 56-59; see Busupra note 61, at 296-302.

ERGENTHAL, PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS,

78. American Convention, supra note 5, art. 64, at 17, 9 I.L.M. at 692; Other Treaties, supra note 74, para. 52.
79.

Other Treaties, supra note 74, para. 52, 22 I.L.M. at 65.

80.

American Convention, supra note 5, art. 66, at 18, 9 I.L.M. at 692.
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Contentious Jurisdiction

The Court's second function is to conduct adjudicatory proceedings
under its contentious jurisdiction. Contentious jurisdiction decisions are
legally binding."' Only the Commission and those state parties that are
signatories to the American Convention have the right to submit a case

to the Court.2 Individuals may access the Court only through the Commission's individual petition procedure. 3 In order to be subject to the
Court's adjudicatory power, a state must have ratified the American
Convention and formally submitted to the Court's contentious jurisdiciton. 4 A state party may acquiesce to the Court's contentious jurisdiction
unconditionally, on condition of reciprocity, for a set period, or even for
resolution of a single case.8 5
III.

CONTENTIOUS JURISDICTION DECISIONS

As of this writing, the Court has decided only three8 8 contentious jurisdiction cases: the Velasquez Rodriguez Case87 (Velasquez Rodriguez),

the Fairen Garbi and Solis Corrales Case88 (Garbi and Corrales), and
the Godinez Cruz Case 89 (Godinez Cruz). All three of the cases concern
disappearances in Honduras, and all arose from individual petitions the
81. Id. art. 68, at 18, 9 I.L.M. at 693.
82. Id. art. 61, at 17, 9 I.L.M. at 691; Statute of the Court, supra note 64, art. 2(1),
at 105.
83. American Convention, supra note 5, arts. 44, 61, at 13, 17, 9 I.L.M. at 687,
691.
84. Id. art. 62, at 17, 9 I.L.M. at 691-92. Thus far, the following states have accepted the Court's contentious jurisdiction: Argentina, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador,
Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Annual
Report of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 1989, supra note 24.
85. American Convention, supra note 5, art. 62, at 17, 9 I.L.M. at 691-92; Statute

of the Court, supra note 64, art. 2(1), at 105. When a state accepts the Court's contentious jurisdiction on a condition of reciprocity, that state agrees to recognize the Court's
contentious jurisdiction only with regard to interstate claims filed by other states that
have recognized the Court's contentious jurisdiction.
86. This number does not include an earlier case, submitted to the Court in 1981 by
Costa Rica, that the Court declined to examine because the Inter-American Commission
had not first considered the matter. See Matter of Viviana Gallardo, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. G): Judgment of Nov. 13, 1981.
87. Velasquez Rodriguez Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C): Judgment of July 29,
1988, No. 4 [hereinafter Velasquez Rodriguez].

88. Fairen Garbi and Solis Corrales Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C): Judgment of
Mar. 15, 1989, No. 6 [hereinafter Garbi and Corrales].
89. Godinez Cruz Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C): Judgment of Jan. 20, 1989,
No. 5 [hereinafter Godinez Cruz].
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Commission investigated and presented to the Court." ° In each of the
three cases, the Commission asked the Court to determine whether Honduras had violated the American Convention.9 1
A.

Facts and Proceedings at the Commission

Velasquez Rodriguez was the first case the Commission investigated.
It involved the disappearance of Angel Manfredo Velasquez Rodriguez,

a student at the National Autonomous University of Honduras. 2 On
October 7, 1981, the Commission received a complaint alleging that on
September 12, 1981, Velasquez Rodriguez "was violently detained without a warrant for his arrest"9' 3 and "accused of alleged political crimes,
and subjected to harsh interrogation and cruel torture"9 4 by members of
the Honduran armed forces.
The Commission, in carrying out its investigation of the complaint,
requested certain information from Honduras."5 By 1983, despite the
Commission's repeated requests, Honduras still had not supplied the requested information. At that point, relying on article 42 of its regulations,9 6 the Commission presumed "as true the allegations contained in
the communication of October 7, 1981, concerning the detention and disappearance of Velasquez Rodriguez in the Republic of Honduras ' 97 and
advised Honduras that it had violated the American Convention.9
In response to Honduras' request for reconsideration, the Commission
once again gave Honduras an opportunity to present observations and
90. American Convention, supra note 5, arts. 50-51, at 14, 9 I.L.M. at 689; see
supra notes 88-89.
91. American Convention, supra note 5, art. 4 (Right to Life), art. 5 (Right to Humane Treatment), art. 7 (Right to Personal Liberty); Velasquez Rodriguez, supra note
87, paras. 1-2; Garbi and Corrales, supra note 88, paras. 1-2; Godinez Cruz, supra
note 89, paras. 1-2.
92. Velasquez Rodriguez, supra note 87, para. 3.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Case 7920, Velasquez Rodriguez Case, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 61, OEA/ser.L./V./
11.61, doe. 44, res. 30/83 (1983).
96. Article 42 states:

The facts reported in the petition whose pertinent parts have been transmitted to
the government of the State in reference shall be presumed to be true if, during the
maximum period set by the Commission under the provisions of Article 34 paragraph 5, the government has not provided the pertinent information, as long as
other evidence does not. lead to a different conclusion.
Commission Regulations, supra note 37, art. 42, at 131.
97. Case 7920, Velasquez Rodriguez Case, Inter-Am. C.H.R. at 61.
98. Id.
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evidence in its favor. 91 Again, Honduras failed to provide any satisfactory information.'" 0 Consequently, the Commission denied Honduras'
request for reconsideration, and found that all evidence showed that Velasquez Rodriguez was still missing and that the Government of Honduras had not offered convincing proof that would allow the Commission to
determine that the allegations were not true.1 0 1 The Commission concluded that Honduras had violated article 4 (Right to Life), article 5
(Right to Humane Treatment), and article 7 (Right to Personal Liberty)
10 2
and resolved to refer the matter to the Court.
The Commission next examined Garbi and Corrales'0 3 This petition,
which the Commission received on January 14, 1982, complained of the

December 1981 disappearance of Fairen Garbi and Solis Corrales. 1 4
The petition alleged that Garbi and Corrales disappeared while driving
through Honduras in route to Mexico from Costa Rica. 05 The petition
claimed that the Honduran government denied that Garbi and Corrales
had ever entered Honduras, while the Nicaraguan government confirmed
their departure for Honduras through the Las Manos border post on
December 11, 1981.108
After Honduras made various inconsistent statements regarding Garbi
and Corralas' entry into Honduras, the Commission found that Honduras had violated article 4 (Right to Life) and article 7 (Right to Personal
Liberty) of the American Convention.' 7 Although the Commission
granted Honduras' request for reconsideration,"'0 it determined that
Honduras offered no reason for the Commission to alter its initial findings.109 Therefore, the Commission reaffirmed its initial conclusion that
Honduras was accountable for the disappearance of Fairen Garbi and

99. Case 7920, Velasquez Rodriguez Case, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 68, OEA/ser.L./V./
11.68, doc. 8, rev. 1, res. 22/86 (1986).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Case 7951, Fairen Garbi and Solis Corrales Case, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 84, OEA/
ser.L./V./II.66, doe. 10, rev. 1, res. 16/84 (1985).
104. Id.

105. Id. at 85.
106. Id. Nicaragua submitted photocopies of the immigration cards in the handwriting of the travelers.
107. Id. at 103.
108. Case 7951, Fairen Garbi and Solis Corrales Case, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 47, 49,
OEA/ser.L./V./II.68, doe. 8, rev. 1, res. 23/86 (1986).
109. Id. Honduras initially denied that Garbi and Corrales had entered Honduras
but later claimed that Garbi and Corrales had passed through Honduras and continued
into Guatemala.
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Solis Corrales."10
The third case the Commission investigated was Godinez Cruz."" On
October 9, 1982, the Commission received an individual petition alleging
that on July 22, 1982, Saul Godinez Cruz, a schoolteacher, disappeared.'- 2 The petition alleged "that an eyewitness saw a man in a military uniform and two persons in civilian clothes arrest a person who
looked like Godinez.""'' Further, Godinez Cruz's "house had been
under surveillance, presumably by government agents, for some days
before his disappearance."" 4
As in Velasquez Rodriguez, Honduras ignored the Commission's repeated efforts to secure information regarding Godinez Cruz's disappearance." 5 Thus, the Commission, relying on article 42 of its regulations,"16
presumed the truth of the allegations in the individual petition." 7 After
initially granting Honduras' request for reconsideration" 8 and providing
Honduras ample opportunity to present evidence on its behalf, the Commission resolved that it could not reconsider its decision because Honduras' request was "unfounded and lack[ed] information other than that
already examined" by the Commission."' The Commission concluded
that Honduras had violated article 4 (Right to Life), article 5 (Right to
Humane Treatment), and article 7 (Right to Personal Liberty) and resolved to refer the matter to the Inter-American Court of Human
20
Rights.
B.

Proceedings in the Court

On April 18, 1986, the Commission resolved to refer all three cases to
the Court pursuant to articles 50 and 51 of the American Convention. 2'
110.
111.
112.

Id.
Godinez Cruz, supra note 89.
Id. para. 3.

113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. para. 4.
116. Commission Regulations, supra note 37, art. 42.
117. Godinez Cruz, supra note 89, para. 4.
118. Case 8097, Godinez Cruz Case, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 49, 50, OEA/ser. L./V./
11.68, doc. 8, rev. 1, res. 2/86 (1986).
119. Godinez Cruz, supra note 89, para. 12.
120. Id. paras. 4, 12.
121. American Convention, supra note 5, arts. 50-51, at 14, 9 I.L.M. at 689. The
Commission was authorized to bring the Honduran cases before the Court after completing its internal evaluation because Honduras became a Party to the American Convention on September 8, 1977, and accepted the Court's contentious jurisdiction on September 9, 1981 (Inter-Am. C.H.R. resolutions: 22/86, 23/86, and 24/86 (Apr. 18, 1986)).
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For each of the three cases, Honduras presented six preliminary objections to the Court's jurisdiction.12 2 The Court dismissed five of the objec123
tions and joined pne regarding exhaustion of domestic legal remedies
with the merits of the cases.' 24 Upon review of testimony and documentary evidence, the Court noted that under the American Convention the
otherwise required exhaustion of domestic legal remedies does not apply
where due process of law is unavailable or where a state denies access to
domestic remedies. 125 The Court placed the burden of showing that each
case fell within this exception on the Commission because it was the
party alleging the exception."'
The Court next focused on the merits of each case. In Garbi and
Corrales, the Court found that it could not hold Honduras responsible
because the evidence failed to establish wheie the two individuals had

American Convention, supra note 5, art. 62, at 17, 9 I.L.M. at 691-92.
122. The six objections made by the Government were: a) lack of a formal declaration of admissibility by the Commission; b) failure to attempt a friendly settlement; c)
failure to carry out an on-site investigation; d) improper application of articles 50 and 51
of the Convention; and e) nonexhaustion of domestic legal remedies. See Velasquez Rodriguez Case, Preliminary Objections, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C): Judgment of June 26,
1987, No. 1; Godinez Cruz Case, Preliminary Objections, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C):
Judgment of June 26, 1987, No. 3; Fairen Garbi and Solis Corrales Case, Preliminary
Objections, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C): Judgment of June 26, 1987, No. 2.
123. Exhaustion of domestic-legal remedies is a jurisdictional prerequisite to the admissibility of the Commission's petitions. The Court held that it must determine whether
this requirement is met because it is a matter of interpretation or application of the
Convention. See Velasquez Rodriguez Case, Preliminary Objections, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. C): Judgment of June 26, 1987, No. 1; Godinez Cruz Case, Preliminary Objections, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C): Judgment of June 26, 1987, No. 3; Fairen Garbi and
Solis Corrales Case, Preliminary Objections, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C): Judgment of
June 26, 1987, No. 2.
124. Velasquez Rodriguez Case, Preliminary Objections, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser.
C): Judgment of June 26, 1987, No. 1; Godinez Cruz Case, Preliminary Objections,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C): Judgment of June 26, 1987, No. 3; Fairen Garbi and Solis
Corrales Case, Preliminary Objections, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C): Judgment of June
26, 1987, No. 2.
125. Velasquez Rodriguez Case, Preliminary Objections, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser.
C): Judgment of June 26, 1987, No. 1; Godinez Cruz Case, Preliminary Objections,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C): Judgment of June 26, 1987, No. 3; Fairen Garbi and Solis
Corrales Case, Preliminary Objections, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C): Judgment of June
26, 1987, No. 2.
126. Velasquez Rodriguez Case, Preliminary Objections, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser.
C): Judgment of June 26, 1987, No. 1; Godinez Cruz Case, Preliminary Objections,

Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C): Judgment of June 26, 1987, No. 3; Fairen Garbi and Solis
Corrales Case, Preliminary Objections, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C): Judgment of June
26, 1987, No. 2.
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actually disappeared. 127 By analyzing the signatures on the border-crossing documents, the Court concluded that Garbi and Corrales exited Nicaragua on December 11, but it could not determine whether they entered
Guatemala on December 12.128 Due to the inconsistent evidence
presented, the Court could not conclusively establish that Honduras
played a part in their disappearance.1 2
Upon review of the merits of Velasquez Rodriguez and Godinez Cruz,
the Court addressed the Commission's allegations that Honduras had violated articles 4, 5, and 7 of the American Convention. 130 Regarding
Honduras' objection that the complainants had not exhausted domestic
remedies, the Court determined that the legal remedies in Honduras
were ineffective. 31 The Court attributed the ineffectiveness to the clandestine nature of the imprisonment, the practical inapplicability of the
legal remedies, indifference on the part of the authorities, and an atmosphere of fear and intimidation in the legal profession.13 2 After hearing
the testimony of witnesses and reviewing the evidence, the Court found
sufficient proof of the following facts: from 1981 to 1984, 100 to 150
persons disappeared in Honduras; those disappearances followed a similar pattern; it was public knowledge in Honduras that the state conducted the kidnappings; the disappearances occurred in a systematic
manner; the weapons and equipment the perpetrators used were reserved
for official use; the victims were subjected to cruel and humiliating treatment and torture; the authorities systematically denied any knowledge of

127. Garbi and Corrales, supra note 88, paras. 157-60.
128. Id. paras. 4, 39, 45, 116, 117, 124(a), 124(c), 138. Guatemala stated that Garbi
and Corrales had entered Guatemala from Honduras on December 12, 1981, at the El
Florido border post. Subsequently, Guatemala changed its position and stated that Garbi
and Corrales never entered its territory. Although Guatemala had originally produced
border documents evidencing their crossing, Guatemala later claimed that the border documents were falsified and that the list of entries into Guatemala through El Florido for
December 1981, had disappeared.
129. Id. paras. 157-60.
130. Because of the similarities in the facts of Velasquez Rodriquez and Godinez
Cruz, the Court rendered identical opinions except for its determination of damages. See
Velasquez Rodriquez, supra note 87; Godinez Cruz, supra note 89.
131. Velasquez Rodriguez, supra note 87, paras. 50-81; Godinez Cruz, supra note
89, paras. 53-88.
132. Velasquez Rodriquez Case, Preliminary Objections, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser.
C): Judgment of June 26, 1987, No. 1; Godinez Cruz Case, Preliminary Objections,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C): Judgment of June 26, 1987, No. 3. In Velasquez Rodriguez, three habeas corpus applications and two criminal complaints were filed unsuccessfully. In Godinez Cruz, three habeas corpus applications and one criminal complaint
were filed unsuccessfully.
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the detentions; and judicial proceedings under state authority were
processed slowly with a clear lack of interest.1 3
The Court also found that the disappearances of Velasquez Rodriguez
and Godinez Cruz were part of that pattern. 18 4 Briefly stated, the Court
found that Honduran officials carried out or tolerated a practice of disappearances that existed from 1981 to 1984 and that Honduras' tolerance of the disappearances was a violation of human rights.1 3 In addition, the Commission concluded that the circumstances surrounding the
disappearance of Velasquez Rodriguez and Godinez Cruz coincided with
1 36
the pattern of disappearances during that time.
The Court concluded that Honduras had violated articles 4, 5, and 7
in Velasquez Rodriguez and Godinez Cruz.137 First, the Court determined that the deprivation of "physical liberty without legal cause and
without a determination of the lawfulness of [their] detention by a judge
or competent tribunal" 3 " directly violated their right to personal liberty
under article 7 of the American Convention. 3 9 Second, the Court held
that the "subjection of [Velasquez Rodriguez and Godinez Cruz] to prolonged isolation and deprivation of communication" 14 represented cruel
and inhumane treatment,1 4 ' and further, that such treatment violates
every detainee's right "under Article 5(1) and 5(2) to treatment respectful of his dignity.' 42 Third, with regard to both Velasquez Rodriguez
and Godinez Cruz,4 3 the Court found that Honduras violated article 4

133. Velasquez Rodriguez, supra note 87, paras. 147(a)-(d); Godinez Cruz, supra
note 89, paras. 153(a)-(d).
134. Velasquez Rodriguez, supra note 87, paras. 147, 148; Godinez Cruz, supra
note 89, para. 154.
135. Velasquez Rodriguez, supra note 87, para. 148; Godinez Cruz, supra note 89,
para. 156.
136. Velasquez Rodriguez, supra note 87, para. 148; Godinez Cruz, supra note 89,
para. 156.
137. Velasquez Rodriguez, supra note 87, para. 185; Godinez Cruz, supra note 89,
para. 195.
138. Velasquez Rodriguez, supra note 87, para. 186; Godinez Cruz, supra note 89,
para. 196.
139. American Convention, supra note 5, art. 7, at 3, 9 I.L.M. at 676.
140. Velasquez Rodriguez, supra note 87, para. 187; Godinez Cruz, supra note 89,
para. 197.
141. Velasquez Rodriguez, supra note 87, para. 187; Godinez Cruz, supra note 89,
para. 197.
142. Velasquez Rodriguez, supra note 87, para. 187; Godinez Cruz, supra note 89,

para. 197.
143. Velasquez Rodriguez, supra note 87, para. 188; Godinez Cruz, supra note 89,
para. 198.
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of the American Convention.' 4 The Court determined that the circumstances surrounding their disappearances and the lack of knowledge
about their fate created a reasonable presumption that they were
killed.' 4 5
Finally, the Court held that the violations of articles 4, 5, and 7 necessarily implied a violation of article 1(1) of the American Convention. 4"
Article 1(1) creates a legal duty on the part of the state parties to guarantee the rights and freedoms recognized in the American Convention. 4 '
The Court held that Honduras' failure to provide the protections of articles 4, 5, and 7 was a violation of its legal duty under article 1(1) of the
Convention to ensure the rights recognized in the Convention. 4"
In a separate opinion on the issue of damages, the Court awarded
compensatory damages in the amount of 750,000 lempiras to be paid by
Honduras to the family of Velasquez Rodriguez.' 49 In a concurrent
opinion, the Court awarded compensatory damages in the amount of
650,000 lempiras to the family of Godinez Cruz.' 50
IV.

EFFECTS OF CONTENTIOUS JURISDICTION

An international system for the protection of human rights operates
through the people it protects, the governments it monitors, and the organs of the system itself. In order to maximize its effectiveness, a system
should take each of these elements into account in planning its development. While the concept of human rights is universal, the methods of
promotion and protection of those rights vary. Unique cultural, political,
and economic factors justify the regionalization of human rights systems.
Similarly, an analysis of a regional human rights system necessarily considers these factors in its measurement of a system's successes and failures. Moreover, the uniqueness of each region counsels against compari144. American Convention, supra note 5, art. 4, at 2, 9 I.L.M. at 677.
145. Velasquez Rodriguez, supra note 87, para. 188; Godinez Cruz, supra note 89,
para. 198.
146.

Velasquez Rodriguez, supra note 87, paras. 161-62; Godinez Cruz, supra note

89, paras. 170-71.

147.

American Convention, supra note 5, art. 1(1), at 1, 9 I.L.M. at 675.

148.

Velasquez Rodriquez, supra note 87, para. 182; Godinez Cruz, supra note 89,

para. 192.
149. Velasquez Rodriquez Case, Compensatory Damages, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser.
C): Judgment of July 21, 1989 (art. 63(1) No. 7). The Court set loss of earnings at
500,000 lempiras and moral damages at 250,000 lempiras. Id. paras. 49, 51.
150. Godinez Cruz Case, Compensatory Damages, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C):
Judgment of July 21, 1989 (art. 63(1) No. 8). The Court set loss of earnings at 400,000
lempiras and moral damages at 250,000 lempiras. Id. paras. 47, 50.
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sons with other regional human rights systems.' 5 ' Given the
characteristics of the American States, it is questionable whether contentious jurisdiction, so effective in other regions, is an appropriate tool for
the enforcement of human rights in the OAS.
A.

ContentiousJurisdiction'sEffect on Citizens' Perceptions of the
Court

The best human rights system is ineffective without the support of the
citizens it protects, and a court cannot obtain that support unless it
tailors itself to the culture that it serves. Over two-thirds of the OAS is
made up of Latin American states.152 Such a large presence necessarily
makes Latin America a major player in the creation, implementation,
and ultimate success of any Inter-American human rights effort. Thus,
the potential impact of Latin American culture on the exercise of the
Court's contentious jurisdiction is an important consideration for planning the speed and direction of the Court's growth.
The Court's exercise of contentious jurisdiction infringes on at least
two fundamental tenets of Latin American culture.' 5 First, Latin Americans share a distrust of authority; 154 second, this distrust escalates when
151. For examples of comparisons between the European and Inter-American systems, see Burns H. Weston et al., Regional Human Rights Regimes: A Comparison and
Appraisal, 20 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 585 (1987); Thomas Buergenthal, International Human Rights Law and Institutions: Accomplishments and Prospects, 63 WASH.
L. REV. 1 (1988); Jochen A. Frowein, The European and the American Conventions on
Human Rights-A Comparison, I HUM. RTs. L.J. 44 (1980).
152. Twenty-five of the thirty-five OAS member states are Latin American: Argentina, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican
Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay, and Venezuela. JOYCE
Moss & GEORGE WILSON, PEOPLES OF THE WORLD: LATIN AMERICANS (1989); THE
WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 1992, supra note 1.
153. See LEWIS HANKE, CONTEMPORARY LATIN AMERICA: A SHORT HISTORY
255-59, 460-76 (1968); MICHAEL D. OLIEN, LATIN AMERICANS: CONTEMPORARY
PEOPLES AND THEIR CULTURAL TRADITIONS 103-06 (1973); UNESCO, Cultura y
Sociadad En America Latina y El Caribe 25-45, 131-53 (1981); HUGH
O'SHAUGHNESSY, LATIN AMERICANS 25-37 (1988); THOMAS E. SKIDMORE & PETER
H. SMITH, MODERN LATIN AMERICA 339-43, 355-58 (1984); UNESCO, America Latina En Sus Ideas 95-117, 201-38 (1986); VICTOR ALBA, THE LATIN AMERICANS 17-

47, 138-71, 277-332, 335-52 (1969).
154. See LEWIS HANKE, CONTEMPORARY LATIN AMERICA: A SHORT HISTORY
255-59, 460-76 (1968); MICHAEL D. OLIEN, LATIN AMERICANS: CONTEMPORARY
PEOPLES AND THEIR CULTURAL TRADITIONS 103-06 (1973); UNESCO, Cultura y
Sociadad En America Latina y El Caribe 25-45, 131-53 (1981); HUGH
O'SHAUGHNESSY, LATIN AMERICANS 25-37 (1988); THOMAS E. SKIDMORE & PETER
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foreign institutions threaten national sovereignty.15 5 These cultural traits
may surface as skepticism toward an external guardian of human rights
such as the Court.
With the exception of the United States, Canada, and the Englishspeaking Caribbean, the Inter-American region has suffered from a lack
of stability and permanence in government and legal systems.'o Latin
American states have experienced protracted social and economic upheaval punctuated by warring political factions, military rule, and coup
d'etats. 15 7 The widespread instability may be responsible for causing in
the citizenry a tacit expectation, if not fear, of transience in their leaders,
governments, and justice systems. This condition has made it difficult for
the Inter-American human rights system to gain the trust and faith of
the Latin American people. 58
During the past two decades, the Commission has endeavored to overcome the Latin American citizens' skepticism and distrust by steadily
expanding the scope and effectiveness of its human rights work in the
region. 5 Latin Americans have seen the Commission expose many
human rights violations.' 6 0 In addition, Latin Americans have seen their

governments subject themselves to Commission investigations and comply
with Commission recommendations and Inter-American Court advisory
opinions. 6,

339-43, 355-58 (1984); UNESCO, America LaIdeas 95-117, 201-38 (1986); VICTOR ALBA, THE LATIN AMERICANS 1747, 138-71, 277-332, 335-52 (1969).
H.

SMITH, MODERN LATIN AMERICA

tina En Sus

155.

Id.

156.

JACQUES LAMBERT,

LATIN AMERICA: SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND POLITICAL

(1967). Lambert notes:
The fact is that in no other part of the world has political life been so stormy: 5
assassinations of heads of states between 1955 and 1961; over 30 military coups
between 1940 and 1965, and even two real social revolutions-in Bolivia in 1952
and in Cuba in 1959. Nowhere else have there been so many short-lived constitutions; nowhere else have personal dictatorships disguised themselves so well behind
a facade of legality.
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Id.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id.
Forsythe, supra note 45, at 80-92.
See supra subpart II(C) discussing the Commission's evolution.
O.A.S. Human Rights Report Warns Mexicans on Election Fraud, N.Y.

TIMES, June 4, 1990, at 17A.

161. See Restrictions to the Death Penalty, Advisory Op. No. OC-3/83, Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (ser.A): Judgments and Opinions, No. 3 (1983) (Commission's request for an
advisory opinion led Guatemala to suspend the death penalty in cases involving crimes
related to political offenses); Robert E. Norris, ObservationsIn Loco: Practiceand Procedure of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 1979-1983, 19 TEXAS
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The Court's exercise of contentious jurisdiction could erode the InterAmerican system's success in gaining the respect and trust of Latin
Americans. An erosion of confidence might result if, in an effort to avoid
a contentious judgment, states restrict the Commission's ability to conduct country studies and discourage individual petitions to the Commission through internal methods of suppression.' 6 2 Before the Court began
its exercise of contentious jurisdiction, the Commission and the Court
developed visibility and respect for their decisions by appealing to the
power of publicity. 63 A negative state reaction to contentious jurisdiction
could result in a loss of the Commission's and the Court's ability to expose some of the human rights violations. In the end, a state's refusal to
allow the kind of access granted in the past may cause conditions to
become worse than they are today. If this occurs, the Inter-American
system's effectiveness may be reduced dramatically.
A second obstacle to public acceptance of the Court's contentious jurisdiction is the traditional importance of national sovereignty to Latin
American states. 164 Many of the Inter-American states have a great deal
of national pride, despite the domestic problems they may have.' 66 This
strong sense of nationalism causes the people of a given state to be
fiercely protective of their state's sovereignty.'
Perhaps as a result of
living in the shadow of the United States, this preoccupation with sovereignty is particularly evident in the Latin American region.617 This factor may operate to limit the effectiveness of the Inter-American system's
protection of human rights. Aggressive exercise of contentious jurisdic-

L.J. 285 (1984); A Gainfor the Latin Media, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1985.
162. See Norris, supra note 161, at 288-97. In 1979, during a Commission on-site
investigation in Argentina, the Commission and witnesses were harassed, and files gathered for the Commission were confiscated under a judge's order. Id.
163. Approximately 4000 new individual petitions were filed during the Commission's on-site investigation in Argentina in 1979, and approximately 3,000 individual
petitions were filed during the Commission's visit to Nicaragua in 1980. Weston et al.,
supra note 151, at 619. Both of these figures were substantial increases over the number
of petitions normally received. Id. Professor Tom Farer, former President of the InterAmerican Commission, has stated that "the prospect or consequences of a Commission
inquiry has saved lives, averted torture, terminated arbitrary detentions, and ameliorated
conditions of detention." Tom J. Farer, The OAS at the Crossroads:Human Rights, 72
IOWA L. REV. 401, 403 (1987); see also Norris, supra note 161, at 285; FARER, THE
GRAND STRATEGY, supra note 12, at 86-97; TOM J. FARER, THE FUTURE OF THE
INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM 138 (1979) [hereinafter FARER, THE FUTURE].
164. HANKE, supra note 153, at 255-59, 460-76.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
INT'L
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tion could incite strong feelings of nationalism and result in a backlash
against the Court's interference in domestic affairs.
Since 1948 the terms of the OAS Charter have reflected the Latin
preoccupation with national sovereignty."6 The OAS Charter contains
language which stresses regional endorsement of national sovereignty
and nonintervention in domestic affairs.'" 9 This resulted from Latin ef70
forts to restrict United States intervention.
Historically, the Latin American states have reacted negatively and
sometimes violently to foreign intrusion into domestic matters. For example, many Latin American states opposed United States intervention in
1
the Cuban revolution in 1959. 71
Similarly, most OAS states opposed
United States covert action against the Sandinista government in Nicaragua and the United States invasion of Grenada. 7 2 Most recently, this
preoccupation with national sovereignty manifested itself in OAS members' unanimous condemnation of the United States invasion of Panama
in 1989.7

1

In the face of such public distrust of foreign influence, actions by a
foreign judicial body may encounter serious difficulties. Contentious jurisdiction and related adjudicatory authority give the Court the power to
intrude on states' domestic affairs.' 74 While in the context of human
rights this seems desirable, there is a danger that Latin Americans will
perceive this ability to shape domestic affairs as a threat to national sovereignty. The Court should consider Latin Americans' reactions to other
foreign intrusions in determining whether it should expand its use of
contentious jurisdiction.
B.

ContentiousJurisdiction'sEffect on Advisory Opinions

Some human rights observers portray the Court's advisory jurisdiction
as a temporary and imperfect vehicle for the Court's authority, with the
ultimate goal being the full and routine use of contentious jurisdiction. 7 5
The source of this view may be the European Court of Human Rights'
168. Forsythe, supra note 45, at 77.
169. Id.; see also OAS Charter, supra note 1, arts. 8, 9, 13, at 2419, 119 U.N.T.S.
at 55-56. "States are judicially equal, enjoy equal rights and equal capacity to exercise
these rights and have equal duties." Id. art. 9, at 2419, 119 U.N.T.S. at 55.
170. Forsythe, supra note 45, at 77.
171. Id. at 81.
172. Id.

173.
174.
175.
Rights,

Id.
See supra subpart III(B).
See Regional Human Rights Regimes, supra note 151; Buergenthal, Human
supra note 76, at 309-10.
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(the European Court) extensive use of contentious jurisdiction.1 76 It is
true that the European Court's use of contentious jurisdiction has been
highly successful.1 7 It does not necessarily follow, however, that a similar level of use would be as effective in the Inter-American system. Considering the characteristics of the region's peoples, the Inter-American
system's more extensive reliance on its advisory jurisdiction seems more
appropriate.
Advisory opinions tend to yield general legal principles without adjudicating guilt or fault.1" 8 That is, they simply set forth the Court's opinion on a matter, and the state parties are free to disregard the opinion
with legal, if not moral, impunity.'M Fortunately, the state parties have
generally shown respect for the Court's advisory opinions and often voluntarily follow the Court's guidance.'8 0 This excellent record may be
due in part to the voluntary nature of advisory opinions.
In contrast, compliance with decisions rendered under contentious jurisdiction is not voluntary, as it is with those decided under advisory
jurisdiction. The exercise of contentious jurisdiction yields legally binding decisions; these decisions instruct a state what that state must do.""'
This aspect of contentious jurisdiction conflicts with the cultural "machismo" inherent in Latin American governments and leaders.' 2 "Machismo" represents a Latin American "sense of manliness which if ignored
or undermined produces humiliation."' 8 3 As anyone familiar with Latin
American culture can confirm, giving orders is not the best way to win
support and compliance.' 84 In fact, anyone interfering with this Latin
American sense of manliness "is considered an enemy, one to be dealt

176.

The European Court currently decides 30 to 40 cases each year under its con-

tentious jurisdiction. As of 1987, the European Court had decided 114 cases, approximately two-thirds of which were decided since 1980. Brian Walsh, The European Court
of Human Rights, 2 CONN. J. INT'L L. 271, 284 (1987). As of 1988, 19 of 21 state
parties to the European Convention on Human Rights had accepted the European
Court's contentious jurisdiction. Id.
177. See Weston et al., supra note 151.

178. Thomas Buergenthal, The Advisory Practice of the Inter-American Human
Rights Court, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 18 (1985) [hereinafter Buergenthal, The Advisory
Practice].
179. Id.; see also American Convention, supra note 5, art. 64, at 17, 9 I.L.M. at
692.
180. See Buergenthal, The Advisory Practice, supra note 178, at 1.
181. American Convention, supra note 5, art. 68, at 18, 9 I.L.M. at 693.
182. See generally MARVIN K. MAYERS, A LOOK AT LATIN AMERICAN LIFESTYLES (1976).
183. Id. at 39.
184, Id. at 14.
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with, if not destroyed." 8 5 Advisory opinions have not encountered this
obstacle because they recommend action rather than dictate it. Imposing
binding legal authority may result in a refusal to abide by decisions rendered under the Court's contentious jurisdiction, which may lead to a
deterioration of respect for the Court.
If extensive use of contentious jurisdiction erodes respect for the
Court, it may also lead to a loss of respect for advisory opinions. Compliance with an advisory opinion does not carry the stigma of guilt, nor is
compliance legally required. 86 Consequently, cooperation with advisory
opinions is more forthcoming and refusals to cooperate with advisory
opinions are less damaging to the Court's stature. Disregard for a contentious jurisdiction decision, however, could have more serious consequences because contentious jurisdiction decisions are legally binding yet
unenforceable in practice.1 8 7 In order to avoid an adverse reaction to
binding decisions, the Court should refrain from expansive use of its contentious jursidiction. Moreover, scholars and politicians should not promote the exercise of contentious jurisdiction as an eventual replacement
for advisory jurisdiction. Since contentious jurisdiction is likely to conflict
with Latin culture, the OAS should retain the Court's advisory jurisdiction as the principal means of curbing human rights abuses in the
region.

C. ContentiousJurisdiction'sEffect on United States Ratification of
the American Convention
United States support for a regional human rights system is at best
inconsistent. Historically, the United States has shown support for the
Inter-American system when it appeared the system could serve as an
anticommunist watchdog.' 8 8 Most of the time, however, the United
States has sought to limit the reach of the human rights organs."8 The
United States has neither ratified the American Convention nor accepted
the Court's contentious jurisdiction. Obtaining United States ratification
185. Id. at 39.
186. See Buergenthal, The Advisory Practice, supra note 178, at 1.
187. Even a single state's refusal to adhere to a decision may damage the Court's
stature. Although Honduras cooperated with the first few contentious jurisdiction proceedings, but there is no guarantee that future decisions will command the same respect.
As the International Court of Justice discovered, respect for a court's decisions in Latin
America is not guaranteed. Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 392 (Nov. 26); 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27) (facts and
holding discussed infra subpart IV(C)).
188. Forsythe, supra note 45, at 81-89.

189. Id.
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is an important goal for the Inter-American system. Because the Court's

use of contentious jurisdiction strengthens United States arguments
against ratification, the OAS should carefully consider this cost before
expanding.
Initially, the United States opposed a dynamic or authoritative human
rights system, supporting instead a weak system geared towards promotion rather than enforcement of human rights. x90 When the OAS created
the Inter-American Commission in 1960, the United States sought to
reduce the length of its sessions and to disallow its authority over individual complaints.191 Growing concern over human rights violations in
Cuba temporarily altered this position. 192 The Commission's focus on
Cuba played a large part in United States acquiescence to an increase in
the scope of Commission activities. 193 For the most part, however, the
United States, like most OAS members, has maintained the position that
human rights issues are a domestic matter and prefers an extremely
weak Commission. 9 Generally, United States support for regional
human rights throughout the 1950s, 1960s, and early 1970s existed only
to the extent that human rights protection coincided with the promotion
of democracy.'" 5
The Carter administration took a more active role in promoting a
strong regional human rights system. President Carter, in addition to
making the promotion of human rights an express part of his foreign
policy, 9 6 signed the American Convention and submitted it to the Senate
for advice and consent. 9 7 The Senate, however, failed to ratify the

190.

Id.; see Jack Donnelly, International Human Rights: A Regime Analysis, 40

INT'L ORG. 599 (1986).

191.

Forsythe, supra note 45, at 76-78. The United States abstained from the vote

creating the Commission. Id.
192. Id. at 82-83.
193. Id. The United States willingness to tolerate a more active Commission is attributable to its intent to use the OAS for anticommunist ends. Id.
194. Id. at 80-89. During the Kennedy administration, the United States placed
slightly greater importance on human rights protection, but it continued to regard human
rights as a method of socioeconomic reform tied to anticommunism. Id. at 84; see FARER,
THE GRAND STRATEGY, supra note 12, at 69-78, 86-97; Donnelly, supra note 190, at
624-28.
195. See FARER, THE GRAND STRATEGY, supra note 12, at 3-60.
196. Richard R. Fagen, The CarterAdministration and Latin America: Business as
Usual?, 57 FOREIGN AFF. 652 (1978).
197. MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES: FouR TREATIES
PERTAINING TO HUMAN RIGHTS, S. ExEc. Docs. C, D, E, & F, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.

(1978).

1993]

COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS

98
American Convention.1

Despite the Carter administration's failure to achieve United States
ratification of the American Convention, the United States played an important role in urging others to ratify the Convention and to accept the
Court's contentious jurisdiction. 199 Yet, even the Carter administration's
support for human rights was imperfect, as evidenced by its indifference
to human rights violations by President Pinochet in Chile after the
United States-backed overthrow of Marxist President Allende in
1973.200

The Court's exercise of contentious jurisdiction makes United States
ratification of the American Convention or acceptance of the Court's contentious jurisdiction unlikely because it exacerbates United States concerns regarding national sovereignty and constitutional conflicts. 2"' First,
critics opposing United States adherence to international human rights
treaties and decisions argue that human rights are a matter of domestic
jurisdiction. 22 Under its Constitution, the United States cannot use its
treaty-making power to regulate a matter not subject to international
negotiation. 2 3 Human rights, critics argue, are a strictly domestic concern and are therefore outside the purview of an international agreement. 20 4 Thus, an'international court of human rights, particularly one
with adjudicatory jurisdiction, is not compatable with the United States
system of justice.
The second argument these critics raise is that the laws or decisions

198.

President Carter's 1977 Address to the Senate set forth the Convention's con-

flicts with United States constitutional law. The President submitted the American Convention for ratification with a specific reservation that United States adherence is subject
to its Constitution and laws. Id.; see also INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
GROUP, U.S. RATIFICATION OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES 104-13 (1981).
199.

WESTVIEW SPECIAL STUDIES ON LATIN AMERICAN AND THE CARIBBEAN,

(J. Martz
& L. Schoultz eds., 1980). The United States has been particularly willing to urge
human rights compliance in states receiving United States economic or security assistance. See Foreign Assistance Act §§ 502B, 116, as amended 22 U.S.C. §§ 2304, 2151
(1988).
200. In contrast to the Carter administration's endorsement of the Convention, the
Reagan and Bush administrations have been indifferent and even hostile to the American
Convention and the Court. Forsythe, supra note 45, at 86-88.
201. See Thomas Buergenthal, The U.S. and InternationalHuman Rights, 9 HUM.
RTS. L.J. 141 (1988) [hereinafter Buergenthal, InternationalHuman Rights].
202. Id. at 147.
203. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2; see Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE
CONSTITUTION 143-48 (1972).
204. Buergenthal, InternationalHuman Rights, supra note 201, at 147.
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that the American Convention and the Court generate may conflict with
United States constitutional law.2"' The concern is that an external body
will develop United States constitutional law or that external decisions
will modify fundamental tenets of United States law. 20 ' A practical example of this conflict is the recent Commission resolution that found the
United States in violation of the American Declaration.20 7 The Commission found that the United States execution of two individuals convicted
of murder before they were eighteen years of age violated article I of the
American Declaration (Right to Life). 2 8 The United States did not heed
the Commission's requests to stay the executions because the executions
did not violate the United States Constitution." 9
Even if the United States had accepted the Court's contentious jurisdiction at the time the Commission reviewed this question, it is possible
that the United States would have ignored a Court decision to stay the
executions. Evidence of how the United States might have responded appears by analogy to the United States lack of respect for the judgment of
the International Court of Justice in Military and ParamilitaryActivi21 0 After the International Court of Justies in and Against Nicaragua.
tice ruled against the United States, the United States withdrew its qualified consent to jurisdiction."' "[S]ubtle factors of national pride" 21 2 with
respect to the constitutional system prevent the United States from admitting the need to submit to international human rights law.21 ' These
same "subtle factors" will make it more difficult to obtain United States
ratification of the American Convention if a body of regional human
rights case law begins to supplement the Convention.

205. Id. at 148; see also INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW GROUP, supra note
198, at 104-13.
206. Buergenthal, InternationalHuman Rights, supra note 201, at 147.
207. Case 9647, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 61, OEA/ser.L./VII.71, doc. 9, rev. 3 (1987).
208. American Declaration, supra note 7, art. 1; Case 9647, Inter-Am. C.H.R. at
61.
209. Pinkerton v. McCotter, 473 U.S. 925 (1985); Roach v. Martin, 757 F.2d 1463
(4th Cir. 1985). The two defendants were tried as adults. The United States denied the
existence of a customary international law norm prohibiting the execution of juveniles
and maintained that it had dissented from such a treaty standard.
210. Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
1984 I.C.J. 392 (Nov. 26); 1986 I.C.J. 14 (june 27).
211. Forsythe, supra note 45.
212. Laura Dalton, Comment, Stanford v. Kentucky and Wilkins v. Missouri: A
Violation of an Emerging Rule of Customary InternationalLaw, 32 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 161, 184 (1990) (citing Richard B. Bilder, Integrating International Human
Rights Law into Domestic Law - U.S. Experience, 4 Hous. J. INT'L L. 1, 8 (1981)).
213.
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The constitutional issue also raises a question regarding the impact
that ratification of the Convention or acceptance of contentious jurisdiction would have on federalism in the United States. Since under United
States constitutional law international treaties have the same legal
weight as federal statutes,21 4 the American Convention has the potential
to "federalize" legal issues that individual states currently decide based
on state law.215
Contentious jurisdiction decisions, while not technically a component
of the American Convention, may arguably be incorporated as case
law. 216 If so, use of contentious jurisdiction would have the effect of continuously adding to United States federal law. This threatens to make
the Inter-American Court the equivalent of a second United States Supreme Court, allowing the Inter-American Court to federalize new legal
questions at will. Thus, the existence of contentious jurisdiction case law
strengthens United States arguments against ratification of the
Convention.
Ratification of the Convention by the United States should be a top
priority at this point in the Inter-American system's development. It
would lend an air of legitimacy, which has eluded the system, and would
enhance the credibility of the Commission and the Court, thereby increasing the strength of its advisory opinions. Instead of trying to expand
its contentious jurisdiction, which lessens the likelihood of United States
ratification, the Court should focus on obtaining United States ratification and expanding its use of advisory opinions.
VI.

CONCLUSION

During the past fifteen years, which saw the adoption of the American
Convention and the creation of the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights, the regional system for protection of human rights has vastly
expanded its scope. Although the Court exercised only advisory jurisdiction in its early years, it recently has asserted its contentious jurisdiction.
The exercise of contentious jurisdiction, however, may conflict with
Latin American culture, with continued respect for advisory opinions,
and with efforts to obtain United States ratification of the American

214. Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190 (1888).
215. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920) (state powers may be transferred to
the Federal Government through the treaty making process); Buergenthal, International
Human Rights, supra note 201, at 147-48.
216. This is similar to the way United States case law is used to interpret and give
meaning to the United States Constitution. See 16 C.J.S. ConstitutionalLaw, §§ 17, 20,
at 169-74.
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Convention. These conflicts suggest that precipitated and uncontrolled
exercise of the Court's contentious jurisdiction may detract from the region's perception of the Court as a permanent sentry for the protection
and preservation of human rights.
It is posgible that contentious jurisdiction will be appropriate at some
future time in the Court's development; however, now is not the time.
Instead, the Inter-American system in general and the Court in particular should focus on developing the Court's advisory jurisdiction. This
includes securing ratification by those states that have not yet done so,
enhancing respect for the Court's advisory opinions, developing a larger
body of advisory opinions, and increasing the awareness of human rights
throughout the region. If state parties perceive the Court as inflexible
and dictatorial so early in its development, they may discontinue their
voluntary submission to the Court's jurisdiction. Such a response would
jeopardize the future exercise of contentious jurisdiction-if it should
ever become appropriate.
The Inter-American system will live or die by the support of the region it serves. It is an unfortunate reality that the region is plagued by
periodic violence, government instability, widespread social inequality,
and economic stagnation. The Inter-American system must consider
these realities and the unique characteristics of the OAS member states,
the state parties, and the citizens of the region before it decides to undertake extensive use of contentious jurisdiction.
Michael Jose Corbera

